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Abstract
Luciano Floridi was not the first to discuss the idea of group privacy, but he was
perhaps the first to discuss it in relation to the insights derived from big data analytics.
He has argued that it is important to investigate the possibility that groups have rights to
privacy that are not reducible to the privacy of individuals forming such groups. In this
paper, we introduce a distinction between two concepts of group privacy. The first, the
Bwhat happens in Vegas stays in Vegas^ privacy (in the following: WHVSV privacy),
deals with confidential information shared with the member of a group and inaccessible
to (all or a specific group of) outsiders. The second, to which we shall refer as
inferential privacy, deals with the inferences that can be made about a group of people
defined by a feature, or combination thereof, shared by all individuals in the group. We
show why we unreservedly agree with Floridi that groups can have a form of privacy
that amounts to more than the mere fact of being sets of individuals each of whom has
individual privacy; moreover, like Floridi, we find it plausible that at least some groups
(those satisfying our definition of type-a groups) may have a right to a species of group
privacy (that is, WHVSV privacy) as groups (and not just as individuals who belong to
those groups). However, by turning our attention to the context of big data analytics, we
show that the relevant, new notion of group privacy is one of inferential privacy. We
argue that an absolute right (either of individuals or groups) to inferential privacy is
implausible. We also show that many groups generated algorithmically (those satisfy-
ing our definition of type-b groups) cannot be right holders as groups (unless they
become type-a groups).
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1 Introduction
Luciano Floridi was not the first to discuss the idea of group privacy, but he was
perhaps the first to discuss it in relation to the insights derived from big data analytics
(Floridi 2014, 2016). He has argued that it is important to investigate the possibility that
groups have rights to privacy that are not reducible to the privacy of individuals
forming such groups.1 He has significantly contributed to advancing the view that
the protection of the privacy of a group should also be a goal of privacy regulation, in
response to advances in big data technology. He has objected to the Bindividualism^ of
most data protection regulations, for example, the EU General Data Protection Regu-
lation. This is centered on identifiable individuals,2 where individuals are defined as
Bnatural persons^ (Com (2012) 10 final 2012/0010, cited in Floridi 2016). There are
risks for privacy, Floridi claims, resulting from the assumption that if the privacy of
individuals is taken care of, the privacy of groups will take care of itself. This warrants
the philosophical exploration of theories of group privacy, which conceptualize group
privacy as the privacy of a group which is not achieved, automatically, by protecting
the individual privacy of all members of a group. Since Floridi does not say clearly
what defines a group (as opposed to a mere set of items), by group, we mean both:
& Groups consisting of natural persons with an interaction history and/or collective
goals in the sense of displaying some meaningful form of agency, as a group, e.g.,
through intentional coordination, or at least awareness of themselves as a group,
with which they identify. (Type-a groups.)
& Groups consisting of natural persons with one or more features in common, who do
not have the property in (a) setting aside the trivial case of shared goals, which are
pursued without a common plan, or for the common good; e.g., smokers share the
goal to smoke. (Type-b groups.)
In this paper, we introduce a distinction between two concepts of group privacy. The
first, the Bwhat happens in Vegas stays in Vegas^ privacy (in the following: WHVSV
privacy), deals with confidential information shared with the member of a group and
inaccessible to (all or a specific group of) outsiders. The second, to which we shall refer
as inferential privacy, deals with the inferences that can be made about a group of
people defined by a feature, shared by all individuals in the group (e.g., being a
smoker).
Floridi (who does not distinguish the two kinds of groups above) argues that groups
should have rights to group privacy, in a strong sense. Group privacy in a strong sense
is to be distinguished from group privacy in a derivative sense, which refers to a
property of a group formed by individuals each of which has individual privacy. In this
paper, we partially agree and partially disagree with Floridi. Section 2 articulates the
scope of our agreement with Floridi. We show that the concept of WHVSV privacy
constitutes a form of group privacy in the relevant strong sense. Thus, we unreservedly
1 In our contribution, the notion of a Bgroup^ refers to set of persons, not to groups (or sets) of any entity. We
are not discussing ontological questions, e.g., whether Bnatural groups^ exist.
2 BWhereas the principles of protection must apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable
person^ (Directive 95/46/Ec, cited in Floridi 2016).
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agree with Floridi that groups can have a form of privacy that amounts to more than the
mere fact of being sets of individuals each of whom has individual privacy; moreover,
like Floridi, we find it plausible that at least some groups (that is, type-a groups) have a
right to a species of group privacy (that is, WHVSV privacy) qua groups (and not just
qua individuals who belong to those groups).
We then (Section 3) turn to inferential privacy. By turning our attention to the
context of big data analytics, we analyze the possibility that the privacy of an individual
is infringed through inferences made by virtue of data about other individuals who
share one or more features with the first. Since all individuals that happen to share the
same feature, or set of features, are exposed to similar risk deriving from the same
inference being made about them, this appears to support a group right to protect the
privacy of that group. We also show that typically, in the big data contexts, these groups
are type-b groups.
In Section 4, we briefly consider the moral right to inferential privacy and deny the
possibility of an absolute right to it, while allowing the possibility of a limited right. In
Section 5, we argue that this is not a group right in the strong sense, but only—at
most—a right of the individuals who happen to belong to the group.
It is important to clarify the relation between the distinction between a-groups and b-
groups and our distinction between two concepts of group privacy. The two distinctions
do not overlap (see Table 1, below). Our claim is not that b-groups cannot have group
rights, because they are b-groups. Our claim is narrower: in the case of a b-group, it is
not plausible to consider inferential privacy as the object of a group right. We remain
agnostic on whether a-groups have group rights to inferential privacy and we do not
examine the claim (which we have not found in the literature) that b-groups should
have group rights to WHSVS privacy.
We do not claim that the two concepts of a Bgroup^ identify a sharp dichotomy.
Indeed, they are more plausibly thought of as two poles in a continuum, with interme-
diate forms in the between. Self-awareness and organizational structure may both come
in degrees. It might be difficult to define sharply how much awareness (or coordination)
an a-group requires. Still, both poles play a significant heuristic function. The concepts
of bald and hairy are meaningful and useful, in spite of their fuzzy nature and doubts
one may have about borderline cases. Moreover, the classification of a set of individ-
uals as an a- or b-group is not static. Consider, for example, lovers of a certain type of
movies. We know that new groups of movies lovers, e.g., lovers of BAfrican-American
Crime Documentaries^ or of BScary Cult Movies from the 1980s^ are identified
algorithmically (Madrigal 2014). If an online platform enables some form of interac-
tion, or elicits some form of non-trivial group self-awareness, among members of these
new groups, the group may then evolve into an a-group, given our definition.
Table 1 The two distinctions between two types of groups and two types of privacy entail four logically
distinct cases. In Section 2 of this paper, we focus on (a) and in Section 3, we focus on (d). These are the focus
of Floridi’s article: (a) makes the idea of group privacy plausible and (d) is the alleged novelty of big data
Types of groups/types of privacy WHVSV privacy Inferential privacy
a-groups a b
b-groups X d
Two Concepts of Group Privacy
We do not claim that the two concepts exhaust the range of all possible distinctions
between all possible concepts of privacy. They are both instances of a more general
access conception of privacy, according to which privacy is a condition of restricted
access to the self or information about the self.3 We recognize that there are more
expansive notions of privacy and of the right protecting it, which are particularly
relevant in the sphere of online interactions. For example, the right to privacy may
be considered an all-encompassing right that provides protection to almost all aspects
of identity, personhood, and dignity (Hildebrandt 2013).4 The concept of privacy as
access has, however, an important history. The first definition of the right privacy, the
right to be left alone (Warren and Brandeis 1890), can be considered a right to limit
access to the self.
Let us briefly clarify how our contribution relates to some other in the litera-
ture. We do not adopt the conceptual framework of Alessandro Mantelero’s (2016)
discussion of group privacy in its entirety. Our thesis about b-groups can be
reformulated, in terms of his distinction, as the claim that b-groups do not have
non-aggregative collective interests in privacy, but only, at most, aggregative
shared interests. However, Mantelero (2016) all concede the possibility of granting
group rights to algorithmically selected groups, without further distinctions be-
tween them.5 By contrast, we provide two arguments for denying group rights in
the strong sense, when they concern the inferential privacy of b-groups.
2 BWhat Happens in Vegas Stays in Vegas^ Privacy
Do groups as such have privacy, or is this only a shortcut to say that all the
individuals in a group have privacy? Skepticism about the concept of group
privacy is that this can only be, at most, a shortcut to say that a group is made
up by entities each of which has individual privacy. This position may be
motivated by a general skepticism about entities like groups and sets, of their
being entities that have properties that are not the mere aggregation of those of the
individuals making them up. This is not our premise. As Floridi points out, a pile
of book can have the property Bbeing too heavy to be moved by a single person^
(2016, 89). Another example of a property of a set that is not a property of its
members is the number of the members of the set. Floridi introduces group
3 Following the familiar Hohfeldian decomposition into distinct incidents, rights to privacy can be
decomposed into claims, liberties, immunities, and powers relative to privacy (Wenar 2011). In our view, a
person’s right to privacy entails, at least, (1) the claim right that other people have a duty not to access and use
personal information and (2) the power right, of the person whose privacy is in question, to annul the duty
corresponding to this claim right, in a way that is limited to specific persons, for specific purposes. The
voluntary and informed sharing of information about the self can, simultaneously, constitute an exercise of the
right to privacy, and imply a loss of privacy (the condition).
4 This expansive conception arguably provides a better interpretation of the approach adopted by European
courts. Our account is philosophical and does not aim to provide an interpretation of the law of European
countries, or any other country. But the fact that we do not define privacy in terms of dignity is not
incompatible with the idea that privacy, or the right to privacy (or both) are de facto, essential for identity,
autonomy, and dignity.
5 Pagallo grants the possibility of Ba procedural right to a judicial remedy against the data controllers,
processors or supervisory authorities^(2016, 163).
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privacy as a property distinct from individual privacy (or the sum thereof) in the
following way:
Consider next the case in which the close friends and relatives (the group) of a
deceased person decide to hold a private funeral. Attendance is by invitation only,
but this is not meant to make the funeral ‘exclusive’. The desired privacy may be
due to a need for intimacy, for respectful quietness, to protect grieving and
reflection, or perhaps because of cultural or religious customs. Whatever the
reasons, in this case it seems very counterintuitive to argue that each member of
the group (each close friend or relative of the deceased) has a right to a private
funeral, or that the privacy demanded is just the collection of all individual
privacies. It seems more reasonable to admit that we are in the presence of a
strong, social sense of group privacy (Floridi 2016, 91 italics added).
This example is entirely plausible. Funeral participants may want to share thoughts and
emotions with other participants to the funeral (so they are not private in that sense), but
may also not want to exhibit to people outside that group. In fact, there are many
examples of group privacy in this sense. Floridi himself mentions, as a case in point, the
Bdefence of privacy at home – that is, within the special group represented by a family^
(2016, 93). (The family is an even clearer example of a type-a group.)
We believe that the sensible concept of group privacy that applies to both the funeral
and the family examples is that of WHVSV privacy, in one of its two variants,
discussed below. The expression Bwhat happens in Vegas stays in Vegas^ refers to
the transgressions of some tourists in Las Vegas, which they do not want their spouses,
friends, and relatives at home to hear about. The idea that what happens in Vegas stays
in Vegas captures the essential logical structure of this form of privacy: sharing
experiences, knowledge, or emotions with insiders, creating a barrier against the gaze
and judgment of outsiders.
WHVSV privacy captures the form of privacy that matters in ordinary forms of
confidentiality and intimacy, which Floridi himself (2016, 96) discusses in relation to
examples involving type-a groups. Consider a situation in which a group (e.g., bach-
elors or bachelorettes) enjoys an experience of group privacy. WHVSV is a genre with
different species, two of which we define here.6 We start with defining Bseclusive-
WHVSV privacy^ (Fig.1), that is more extreme and (perhaps) less common, but
simpler to define.
Definition 1 – seclusive WHVSH privacy:
Group G has seclusive-WHVSV privacy if and only if
1) There is a set of facts, I that includes facts about one or more members of G.
2) All facts in I are known by all members of the group and by no one else outside the
group GC.7
6 Logically speaking, it is possible to define a vast array of different forms of WHVSV privacy by weakening
either the definition of the boundary of the group, e.g. through fuzzy set theory, or of the accessibility of
information for outsiders.
7 Using notation borrowed from set theory, here we use GC to indicate G‘s complement, i.e., all the objects that
do not belong to set G.
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Notice that all definitions of group privacy in this paper follow Ruth Gavison (1984),
Jeffrey Reiman (1976), and others (e.g., Altman 1976; Moore 2003) in defining privacy
as a condition measured in terms of the degree of access others have to the self or
information (in this case, information about the members of the group). Analyzing
whether a parallel argument can be made based on control definition of privacy, for
example, those of Alan Westin (1967), or Fried (1970), is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Seclusive privacy is not the most common kind of WHVSV privacy, as we shall see.
It is the privacy of a shared secret within a group and the kind of privacy enjoyed, for
example, by members of a sect, where all members of a sect know some facts about
each other, e.g., the very fact of being member of the sect and other facts that follow
from it, which are hidden to everyone else.
We will now show that seclusive-WHVSV privacy satisfies the ontological property
discussed by Floridi for it to count as a group feature, in a non-trivial sense which is not
being a group of items each of which has that certain feature. (In this sense, having
seclusive-WHVSV privacy is not a property of the individuals in the group G, in the
same way as Bbeing too heavy to carry^ is not a property of individual books.) For
example, suppose that Ann, Barbara, Charlotte and Donna, four bachelorettes from
Chicago, participate to Ann’s transgressive Las Vegas party. After getting drunk, Ann,
Barbara, Charlotte, and Donna each reveal to the others in the group one of their most
intimate secrets that no one else knows, including their Chicago friends. I stands for the
set including these facts, the Bgroup-private^ facts that are known by all members of the
group and no one outside the group; these are, in this specific example, the secrets
shared by the four bachelorettes in Las Vegas. Notice that the set of group-private facts
is not the set formed by the sum of facts that are individually private for each member
Fig. 1 Seclusive group privacy. Absolutely private information about the group G is shared only between
insiders (circles in the oval) but not with outsiders (circles outside the ovals); an arrow connecting insiders
indicates that those two insiders know about each other’s private information
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of the group (considered a singleton). For clearly the latter would be the set of purely
private facts, known only to the person whose privacy it is and unknown to the other
members of the group. The group having group privacy, so defined, clearly does not
amount to it being made by members, each of which has individual privacy (understood
as the privacy of singleton sets including only the individual whose privacy is in
question).
As anticipated, the most common variety of WHVSV privacy is not seclusive
privacy. Rather, it is a form that we shall label Bantagonistic^ privacy. A paradigmatic
example of relatively private information is the (American) football huddle (Fig. 2),
which is important for football since Bthe essence of the game is the team strategy
communicated in the huddle^ (Bloustein 2003, 126). Notice that even when the secrets
communicated in the huddle are broadcast to television audiences, this does not destroy
the usefulness of group privacy, Bso long as the opposition does not learn what is said in
time to anticipate the next play^ (Bloustein 2003, 126). For another example of
antagonistic WHVSV privacy, consider a group of friends out in Vegas for a bachelor
party, illustrated in many Hollywood movies. Here, we shall refer to the recent movie
The Hangover (Phillips 2009). The character called Alan buys memory-erasing drugs
from a drug dealer, the one called Stu marries a stripper, and three of them together,
Alan, Stu, and Phil steal Mike Tyson’s tiger. After a memory loss, making these events
hard to reconstruct, eventually, all four friends find out together the way each of them
spent their nights. In this story, it matters for the future well-being of the group that
information about Vegas does not reach a specific group of outsiders GA, which is a
subset of all outsiders (GC; i.e., GA ⊂GC): wives, fiancées, friends, and acquaintances
back home. This is what the expression Bwhat happens in Vegas stays in Vegas^
plausibly refers to. Antagonistic privacy is not reduced if the Bshared secret^ about
the group is shared with people who are not part of the group, provided that they do not
belong to the Bantagonist^ group (i.e., GC \GA). In this case, for example, what happens
in Vegas is known by the drug dealer, the stripper, the priest celebrating the Las Vegas
wedding, Mike Tyson, and the Las Vegas Police (see Fig. 3). Plausibly, most real-world
cases of WHVSV privacy are antagonistic, not seclusive. One can define Bantagonist^
WHVSV privacy as follows:
Definition 2 – antagonist WHVSV privacy:
Group G has antagonistic WHVSV privacy against a distinct group, GA, if and only
if:
1) There is a set of facts, I that includes personal facts about one or more members of
G.
2) All facts in I are known by all members of the group and by no one else in group
GA.
As the reader can verify, information that is relatively group-private relative to G
against GA does not coincide with the sum of information about G’s members that is
relatively private against GA. The reader can easily check that this is the case (to grasp
why, notice that absolutely private information can be defined as a special case of
relatively private information, where the antagonist group, GA, is the set of all non-
members to G, GC).
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Thus, the two forms of group privacy, both seclusive-WHVSV and antagonistic
WHVSV privacy, justify Floridi’s ideas that it makes sense to speak about group
privacy in a strong sense, such that a group having it, is not the same as a group
having individuals each of whom has individual privacy.
Fig. 2 Football huddle. © Marie-Lan Nguyen / Wikimedia Commons
Fig. 3 Antagonist group privacy: information about the group is shared between insiders (circles in the oval).
Information may reach some outsiders (circles outside the box to which arrows point) provided it does not
reach the Bantagonist^ group (circles in the rectangular)
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Notice that these two forms of WHVSV do not exhaust the space of logical
possibilities of strictly related concepts. The concept of relative-WHVSV privacy may
be weakened, further, by considering G, GC \GA, and GA as groups with fuzzy
boundaries (e.g., some x belongs to G with a probability P) and where the difference
between G, GC\GA, and GA is in terms of ease with which information flows across such
boundaries (again, a matter of different probabilities, rather than a binary condition).
Not only it is perfectly natural to speak of group privacy in this sense, but it is also
easy to understand why individuals have an interest in it. Arguably, both forms of
WHVSV privacy protect:
The desire and need of people to come together, to exchange information, share
feelings, make plans and act in concert to attain their objectives (Bloustein 2003,
125).
This interest is protected by group privacy because humans are social animals and, in
most cases, human happiness
requires that people reveal themselves to one another – breach their individual
privacy – and rely on those with whom they associated to keep within the group
what was revealed. Thus, group privacy protects people’s outer space rather than
their inner space, their gregarious nature rather than their desire for complete
seclusion (Bloustein 2003, 125, italics added).
Related ideas are used in Floridi’s defense of (strong) group privacy. EchoingBloustein’s idea
that group privacy protects a group outer space (Bloustein 2003, 125), Floridi claims that:
entering into a new supra-agent is a delicate and risky operation, care should be
exercised before ‘melding’ oneself with other individuals by sharing personal
information or its source, such as common experiences (Floridi 2016, 96).
Notice that Floridi writes this observation in relation to type-a groups, since the supra-
agent results from individuals united by the sharing of private information Bimplicitly
(especially by doing things together), or explicitly, through communication^ (Floridi
2016, 96). Thus, this is an instance of Ba relation of profound trust that binds the people
involved intimately^ (Floridi 2016, 96). None of this applies to type-b groups.
The defense of Bouter boundaries,^ to which both Floridi and Bloustein refer to, can
be regarded as the precondition for the Bconstruction of an individual’s own identity^
(Floridi 2016, 96), where the identity in question is the identity of a Bnew multi-agent
individual, the group^ (Floridi 2016, 96). One can, then, draw a parallel between
individual privacy, which is necessary for individuals to develop individuality8 and
8 BThe man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose every need, thought,
desire, fancy or gratification is subject to public scrutiny […] merges with the mass. […] Such a being,
although sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual^ (Bloustein 2003, 42).
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group privacy that Bshields the group’s identity^ (Floridi 2016, 95). It is entirely
plausible, as Floridi suggests, that groups with strong bonds, such as Brelatives, friends,
classmates, fellows, colleagues, comrades, companions, partners, teammates, spouses
and so forth^ (Floridi 2016, 96), can become Bsupra-agents^ whose persistence (as the
same group entities) needs to be protected from informational events which threaten
them.
It is possible to see the value of group privacy being affirmed by the laws of liberal
states, even when it is not called by that name. For example, Bthe prohibition of
testimony by one spouse regarding confidential communications with the other^
(Bloustein 2003, 131) can be regarded as a legal recognition of the essential importance
of confidentiality for the intimate bound of love:
Lovers give themselves up to each other. They lay bare their innermost feelings to
each other, they are lewd and foolish with each other, they stand naked before each
other. […] But the premise for giving up individual privacy in love is the feeling
that what is shared so intimately will not be broadcast to the world at large. Indeed
this is the very condition for achieving intimacy (Bloustein 2003, 125).
Yet, not all forms of group privacy are valued as constitutive of (or instrumental to) a
single value or interest: for example, the confidentiality in the attorney-client privilege
is valued because it is necessary if people Bare to enjoy the full benefits of our system of
justice^ (Bloustein 2003, 133), the group privacy of autonomous or private associations
is valued in liberal-democratic societies Bbecause they constitute independent sources
of power and initiative which act to forestall undue accumulation of state power^
(Bloustein 2003, 129), confidentiality between patients and physicians (Bloustein 2003,
133) is valued for the sake of patient’s health, the one between confessor and priest
because for the sake of salvation (or, for non-believers, for spiritual well-being), and the
one between informants and journalists (Bloustein 2003, 135) is valued, ultimately, to
promote truth-seeking and abuse-disclosing behaviors by them, to the advantage of
society as a whole. Notice that one may:
& recognize a concept of WHVSV privacy as a form of group privacy the strong
sense, such that a group having group privacy is not equivalent to a group being
having members all of which have individual privacy
& even recognize that a right to (some forms) group privacy protects important human
interests
and yet
& reject the idea of group privacy as a group right
The idea that group privacy is a right of individuals is the conclusion of Bloustein’s
(2003) analysis of the concept, as some recent contributors to the debate have empha-
sized (Taylor 2016, 14; Mantelero 2016, 143). Bloustein’s conceptualization of group
privacy, which is WHVSV privacy, however, is logically compatible with the idea of
group rights. This is not only a logically coherent proposition but also a morally
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plausible one, as we argue here. Indeed, the plausibility of Floridi’s view of group rights
to group privacy derives from the plausibility of this view.
Group rights should be kept conceptually distinct from individual rights that people
have by virtue of being members of groups, such as, for example, the rights provided to
members of races or ethnic groups by affirmative action laws or the rights of members of
universities (Jones 2016). In Floridi’s world, group rights have to be Brights that belong
only to a group as a group, not to a group insofar as it is constituted by individual persons
who enjoy those rights^ (Floridi 2016, 90). In the literature on group rights, there is
widespread agreement that not every collection of individuals can be, if considered as a
group, a right holder: some threshold of unity or identity has to be reached (Jones 2016).
According to one class of such theories, the relevant condition is the existence of special
bonds among group members (Jones 2016, para. 3).9 Other theories focus on collective
agency, for instance, the theory of Bconglomerate collectivities^ (French 1984), that
applies to organizations that have formalized decision-making procedures.
Other theories, for instanceDwight Newman’s (2011), require groups surviving changes
in individual membership.10 The question here is if it is plausible to talk about a group right
to group privacy, as a privacy right that at least some groups have (these will be type-a
groups, according to our definition, which satisfies either Jones’ or French’s theory).
According to the interest theory of rights (Wenar 2011), the function of rights is to protect
the interests of the right holder. But notice that some of these rights can also, and without
contradiction, be considered protections of interest that groups themselves have.11 The
interests of sport teams, political parties, and states are examples of interests associated with
groups that survive the replacement of their individual members. Suppose that one of
Juventus’ players has a personal problem that prevents him from training. Juventus has an
interest to prevent people outside the organization from acquiring such knowledge, which
may confer a competitive advantage to an opponent. The interest protected by the group
privacy of the team is plausibly considered a distinct right of Juventus as a team, a right of
the collective, which does not derive from the interests in privacy of the individual player.
The other main theory of the function of rights is the will theory, according to which
the function of rights is not to protect interests, but Bto give its holder control over
another’s duty^ (Wenar 2011, para. 2.2.2). Again, it is not too implausible to claim that
at least some groups, e.g., sport teams, political parties, colleagues, charitable associa-
tions, have forms of group agency that enable them to exercise control over the duties of
others. For example, suppose that the bachelorette group forms a private group on
WhatsApp, with one of them as administrators. Any change in the membership of the
group, in particular, adding members, would have to be decided by the group admin-
istrator as a group representative. Arguably, the individual who acts as a group repre-
sentative exercises the group authority in ways that alter the duties of added members.
Summing up, we have provided two definitions of WHVSV privacy both of which
are coherent with Floridi’s claims that there is more to group privacy than the collection
of individuals each with their own privacy. Moreover, we have argued that it is not
implausible to regard groups, at least in certain cases, as the right holders of a right to
9 Examples of these are Galenkamp’s (1993) or McDonald’s (1991) theories.
10 Some of Floridi’s examples of group privacy share this feature.
11 Some legal scholars and philosophers, for example, Jovanović (2012), May (1989), and McDonald (1991),
have claimed groups can have interests.
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group privacy. We now turn to another type of group privacy that becomes increasingly
important in the realm of big data analytics and typically affects type-b groups.
3 Group Privacy, Inferential Privacy, and Big Data
According to Floridi, the question of group privacy is important in the light of privacy
threats posed by big data analytics, because big data Bis more likely to treat types (of
customers, […]), rather than tokens (you, […]), and hence groups rather than individ-
uals (Floridi 2016, 97). By contrast Bour current ethical approach is too anthropocentric
(only natural person count) and nominalist (only the single individual person counts)^
(Floridi 2016, 98, italics added).
Floridi brings attention to Bthe risks involved in opening anonymised personal data
to public use in cases in which groups of people may still be easily identified and
targeted^ (Floridi 2016, 98, italics added). Floridi’s concept of group privacy is
supposed to apply to sets of persons that are Bgrouped algorithmically^ (Taylor 2016,
15), like Bowners of such and such kind of car, shoppers of such and such kinds of
goods […].^(Floridi 2016, 97). As Linnet Taylor observes, Bthe groups created by
profiling using large datasets are different from conventional ideas of what constitutes a
group in that they are not self-constituted but grouped algorithmically^ (Taylor 2016,
14–15). Groups clustered by algorithms, or defined by a feature vector that supports a
prediction, are often constituted by individuals who may not have shared any prior
interaction (Taylor 2016, 15). They are often type-b groups as we defined them. When
predictive models are generated with machine learning, these models can be used to
make predictions about a potentially infinite group of people who share a single feature
or combination of features. Thus, many predictive models convey knowledge about
groups (defined by a feature or set thereof), that are often type-b groups.
The problem predates big data analytics. Virtually, all forms of generalizable knowl-
edge (henceforth, GK) may expose groups to special threats. For example, the discovery
that cancer causes smoking exposes all smokers to higher insurance prices. Linnet Taylor
has argued that group privacy in the big data domain is a novel phenomenon, because the
groups in question are Ba new epistemological phenomenon generated by big data
analytics^ (Taylor 2016, 14). Admittedly, there are differences between knowledge
generated through big data analytics in several new applications and traditional methods
in epidemiology or clinical medicine. But the ultimate goal of all scientific research is to
produce GK, not just knowledge of the research subjects involved in the study. By virtue
of GK extracted from some individuals in a group, inferences about other individuals in
the group can be made. We thus maintain that the essential ethical problem is how to deal
with GK and whether the production of new GK (through big data or other methods)
counts as an infringement of Bgroup privacy.^ We now proceed to provide a definition of
group privacy that is pertinent to the issue at stake, where (type-b) groups are identified by
any feature (or combination thereof) individuals have in common, which is represented as
the result of applying an algorithm, or used in an algorithmic decision.
Definition 3 – inferential group privacy:
The inferential privacy of an entity (individual or group) X, is a measure of the
logically valid inferences, about the sensitive features of X, that cannot be made about
X, based on the available data about X.
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Sensitive features—in this definition—can be defined as features Bwhichmost individuals
in a given society at a given time do not want widely known about themselves^ (Parent 1983,
269–70) and as the feature that a specific X does not want to be revealed about him/her/itself.
It seems clear that inferential privacy andWHVSV privacy are distinct concepts, even if
they are both conditions of restricted access to (the self or) information about the self. Thus,
the fact that some groups (e.g., type-a groups) have rights to WHVSV does not entail that
other groups (e.g., type-b groups) have rights to inferential privacy. We will now analyze
inferential privacy to determine whether a right to inferential privacy is morally plausible
and whether the right holders should be considered individuals, or groups, or both.
4 Is there a Moral Right to Inferential Privacy?
Wewill now briefly discuss the objection that there is no absolute right to inferential privacy,
irrespective of whether this is conceived as a right of individuals or groups. An absolute right
to inferential privacy entails a duty of other people not to draw valid inferences based on the
information that an individual reveals publicly, or to them. The idea of an absolute right of
this kind is problematic for at least two reasons. First, some philosophers have argued that
people lose any right to privacy to information that they make public, whether intentionally
or not (Thomson 1975). Suppose you forget a picture in a place where everyone can see it. It
seems counterintuitive that you have a right that others do not look at it.12
Second, suppose that some scientist S knows that person M belongs to the group G and
she is in the position to discover the generalizable knowledge (GK), which will eventually
become public, that all x who are G have the sensitive feature F (F can also be a propensity,
with a probability). An absolute right to inferential privacy gives M a claim right, that is,
entails a duty of S not to generate (GK). This appears problematic because it basically would
make most of social science research (or public health research) impossible. It seems
unreasonable to confer such power to a member of G or to all of its current members. If
smokers had such right, they could have prohibited the discovery of the GK that smoking
increases cancer risk. It seems unreasonable that an epidemiological study about the relation
between smoking and cancer should be authorized by existing smokers individually or
collectively. After all, this knowledge has an impact on thewell-being of all potential smokers
and on future generations. The interests of all potential, present and future, smokers (and non-
smokers)may not coincidewith the current interests of actual smokers (whomay be unable to
quit smoking, and whose priority may be to avoid paying higher insurance prices).
An absolute right is also problematic because it entails the duty to avoid drawing
spontaneous inferences, for example, deducing that someone you knowwell has lost her
job based on various cues (Rumbold and Wilson 2018, 13). If an observer cannot help
drawing an inference from available generalizable knowledge and public information, it
is unreasonable to demand that she does not draw it, since Bought^ implies Bcan.^
These arguments show that there is no such thing as an absolute right to inferential
privacy, but they do not show that there cannot be a more limited right, e.g., a right to
12 However, it might be a matter of politeness after having spotted the image not to look to closely at the
picture. This politeness may reflect a moral duty to respect privacy. Recently, it has been argued (Rumbold and
Wilson 2018) that Thomson’s argument is invalid because a person cannot waive a right to privacy except by
an intentional act.
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the maximum degree of inferential privacy which can be achieved without imposing
unreasonable costs and limitations on others.13 One problem about such limited right is
that its boundaries will often be unclear. Yet, we will concede here for the sake of the
argument that some boundaries can be defined.
5 Is the Right to Inferential Privacy a Group Right?
Let us grant, for the sake of the argument, that there is such thing as a right to inferential
privacy, understood as the right to the maximum degree of inferential privacy which
can be achieved without imposing unreasonable costs and other limitations on others. It
may still be asked, whether this is a right that groups or individuals have. If such right
exists, it is—we shall argue—more plausibly considered an individual right.
First of all, this is becausemost algorithmically selected groups are what we have labeled
type-b groups—they lack Bthe stronger taste of a ‘we’^, in Floridi’s (2016, 96) own words.
As algorithmically selected individuals may not, and most often do not, experience Bthe
nature of such a bond^ (Floridi 2016, 96), as that of families, spouses, and team members.
As Linnet Taylor emphasizes, algorithmically selected groups Bare not necessarily aware
that they belong to [a group]^ (Taylor 2016, 15). Awareness to group membership is even
less likely to occur in so far as the asset of big data is that we can create feature vectors of
many unrelated features in order to have sufficient prediction power—but those groups are
even much more artificial than the example Bsmoker^ mentioned here. A group consisting
of feature such as drives red car, eats rice, and has long hair may lead to precise predictions,
but is plausibly not a good basis for shaping group identities.
As mentioned above, there are two main theories about the function of rights, the interest
theory and the will theory. According to the interest theory, a right’s function is to protect the
interests of the right holder. But in the case of b-groups, these shared interests are mere
aggregate interests, which do not reflect a pre-existent bond, possibility of collective action, or
group self-awareness. There is no supra-individual agent who can will anything, no idea of a
common good. There are at most the shared interest of the individual members forming the
group, which can be aggregated.14
It is useful to illustrate some differences between algorithmic processes that generate
type-a groups and type-b groups. In the early days of Facebook, if one listed some musical
group as an interest, it would generate a clickable link. Clicking on it would display all
people who had listed the same group as an interest. Arguably, this was an efficient way to
13 This is also Rumbold and Wilson’s conclusion, which accepts that individuals only have a right to a
reasonable degree of control over their information, which can be inferred from public information, and that
you may make your right to privacy defunct by acting in a way that makes it impossible (or too costly, we shall
add) for anyone to discharge the duties associated with such right (Rumbold and Wilson 2018, 17–18). It may
also be compatible with the recent idea of a right to reasonable inferences, but we cannot discuss here the
details of this legal conception (Wachter and Mittelstadt 2018).
14 The point can be formulated in terms of Newman’s (2004) distinction between aggregate (shared) interests
vs. and collective ones, also referred in Mantelero (2016). A collective interest is defined as Ba factor that
contributes toward the continued collaboration of the members of a community as viable and reasonable^
(Newman 2004, 140). By definition, however, b-groups do not have continued community features. For this
reason, we object to Alessandro Mantelero’s view that Bthis atomistic and fragmented dimension [of
algorithmically linked individual interests] demands a collective representation^ (Mantelero 2016, 150) for
the general case.
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find and create non-previously existing communities defined by shared interests, e.g., the
interest in relatively unknown indie groups (Madrigal 2019). The resulting communities
could become type-a groups, because the Facebook link generated awareness in these
individuals, of the link between them. This group self-awareness matched a viable social
identity as Bfans of the samemusical group,^which ismeaningful, at least in US culture.We
do not object to the idea that this algorithmic process can support a collective identity, as
such. We object only to the idea of a (collective) group interest in type-b groups, which by
definition do not have such awareness.
Let us now consider the question from the standpoint of the will theory of rights.
According to the will theory, the function of a right is to determine who has the power to
control other people’s duties. Thus, right holders should, at least in principle, be the kind of
entity that can exercise such control (Wenar 2011, 2.2.2). A clear objection against group
rights to inferential (group) privacy is that an algorithmically sorted group that is a type-b
group cannot exercise the required degree of control, because it is formed by individuals
who are not even aware of themselves as a group. The moment they organize themselves,
they have already changed into a type-a groups.15
Wrapping up, even conceding, that there is a right to inferential privacy, assigning this
right to type-b groups is typically not morally justifiable. It may be objected that groups,
even b-groups, that are created Bfrom outside^ (e.g., by algorithmic processes), have an
interest not to be treated as groups. An example could be inferences that could be made,
through algorithms, concerning sexual orientation, in a society in which homosexuality is
kept hidden, experienced with guilt, not acknowledged as a possible human relation,
stigmatized, and criminalized. In this hypothetical society, let us suppose, homosexual
inclinations do not constitute a viable form of human sociality. Let us also imagine a society
that is not aware of other ways of experiencing homosexuality, as its members do not have
inter alia access to information about cultures where it is experienced differently.
It may well be conceded that individuals in this group may have an interest not to be
treated as a group, e.g., a group that is discriminated. But in this specific society, the group
interest in question is a mere shared interest, the aggregation of similar individual interests. It
is not a collective interest in the sense that presupposes the possibility of group interaction, at
least in planning or in the imagination (D. G. Newman 2004, 140).16 From the point of view
of the will theory—which identifies the right holder as the agent exercising the right—a
group right has no function here, as, by hypothesis, there is no organization or group
representative. If Ba procedural right to a judicial remedy against the data
controllers^(Pagallo 2016, 163) should exist, it seems logical that it should be exercised
by individuals, or by third parties in the name of individuals (who happen to form a group, or
better a set).17 For a different representation to be justified, the group has to, at a minimum,
15 Moreover, even when the organization is feasible, these rights will typically be limited, not absolute, as the
example of the smokers above shows.
16 See note 14 on the difference between the two.
17 Our point is not merely that group rights may conflict with individual rights. Even if Bthe aim of this
protection is […] to complement the [legal safeguard of individual privacy] with [a privacy group
regime]^(Pagallo 2013, 165), our position is that in the case of b-groups there is no (non-merely
aggregative) group interest to protect. There is also no group right to be exercised by groups, or on their
behalf. We also object to the proposal of collective representation exercised by data protection authorities
(Mantelero 2016, 151). The adjective Bcollective,^ here, points to individual rights that people have by virtue
of being members of groups, such as, for example, the rights provided to members of races or ethnic groups by
affirmative action laws. We do not use the expression Bgroup rights^ for these rights.
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acquire awareness of itself qua group. This may happen as a consequence of overt profiling
and discrimination, but it does not have to. If the group identity emerges, the group becomes
a type-a group, according to our definition. We have no issue against the claim, that an
algorithmically sorted group should have the right Bto develop their identity and promote
their interests as a group^ (Van der Sloot 2016, 222), if thememberswant it. But if theywant
this, they represent themselves already as a group, and, thus, qualify already as a type-a
group.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have distinguished two concepts of group privacy, namely
Bwhat happens in Vegas stays in Vegas^ (WHVSV) privacy and inferential
privacy. We have argued a right to group privacy is most plausible in relation
to the WHVSV privacy of type-a groups (groups which have a history of
interactions or non-trivially shared goals). By contrast, what is threatened by
big data analytics is especially the inferential privacy of individuals that are
characterized by features common to open-ended groups. An absolute right to
inferential privacy, we have argued, is implausible to begin with. If a limited
right is plausible, it is not plausible as a group right (in the strong sense) of
algorithmically defined type-b groups.
Both concepts of group privacy (WHVSV privacy and inferential privacy) have
important implications for information and communication technology. Rights to
absolute or antagonistic WHVSV privacy have been implemented already in many
communication platforms, with both beneficial and harmful consequences for society.
Take, for example, private groups on Facebook and group chats on WhatsApp, the
technology behind these allows groups to define, by themselves, boundaries between
insiders and outsiders, which is crucial for WHVSV privacy. Such groups can be
beneficial because they facilitate the expression of minoritarian views and improve the
welfare of minority members that may otherwise feel overwhelmed and intimidated by
majorities. But they can also be harmful to society when they become echo chambers
for favor extreme views and polarization (Sunstein 2017).
The concept of a right to inferential group privacy is important in relation to big data
analytics, for reasons eminently spelled out by Floridi in the paper considered here and the
surrounding literature. But it also seems that the allegedly special threat against the
inferential privacy of groups (compatible with the anonymization of individuals in those
groups) can be reduced to a more familiar problem about harmful uses of generalizable
knowledge. Such knowledge potentially affects many more people besides the limited
sample which enabled the generation of such knowledge. One possible conclusion is that
not all forms of privacy can be protected by giving individuals, or groups, rights to control
information. On the contrary, inferential privacy requires a vision of the societal impact of
knowledge generation, which crucially, researchers and other users of big data analytics also
(perhaps, mainly) have the responsibility to develop.
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